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 This article has been written by International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) in collaboration 
with the Space Generation Advisory Council in support of the UN Programme on Space Appli-
cations (SGAC). This follows on from our paper ‘Militarization of space: a youth perspective’ 
presented at the 52nd Pugwash Conference in La Jolla, 2002, which gave a summary of the 
reasons against space weapons. In that paper we included recommendations for ways for-
ward, both for the international community at large, and Pugwash in particular. The current ar-
ticle aims to address one of our recommendations in that paper to ‘encourage high-level de-
bate’ on this issue. To do this, we have been working together with a US Air Force General to 
develop a critical analysis of both the pros and cons of space weapons, for a nation consider-
ing deployment. By developing a balanced debate, we hope to set a framework for the discus-
sion in which all sides can take part. 
 
There is an urgent need for a discussion on the future military uses of space for several 
reasons. First, the technology for developing and deploying weapons systems in space is 
already available in major space faring nations. Second, conflicts are beginning to arise over 
space-based assets, both for economic and security reasons. Thirdly, there are few legal 
restrictions on the use of space weapons. Finally, a number of political and military leaders in 
some major powers have expressed their support for the deployment of space weapons. 
Deployment could therefore be imminent. Moreover, the stakes are high since once deployed, 
it may be impossible to eliminate space weapons, even if they prove unsuitable or destabilising. 
However, given that deployment has not yet taken place, we have a unique opportunity for 
thinking through these issues now. 
The challenge is to find a way of managing space that avoids the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’, whereby the pursuit of individual rationality by every state leads to a collectively 
worse outcome for everyone. The costs and gains of space weapons must therefore be 
addressed in a comprehensive and balanced debate. In synopsis, short term advantages from 
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acquiring offensive space weapons must be weighed against the medium and long term conse-
quences of deployment, most importantly the risk of a destabilising arms race in space. 
This article, the result of collaboration among a military officer, space professionals, and a 
political scientist, seeks to put the question of space weapons firmly on the security agenda of 
the 21st century. To that end, we offer a framework of analysis that places the issue of space 
weapons in appropriate technological, economic, political, and strategic contexts. 
Diminishing constraints, growing incentives 
A decision to deploy space weapons would not face many constraints, whether technological 
or legal. After years of development, the technology required for space weapons is now 
feasible, albeit still expensive. Both the US and Russia have the capability to deploy advanced 
space weapons in a matter of years. Several other nations have the capability to launch lower 
technology space weapons in a similar timeframe. The Reagan and Bush I administrations 
funded, on the order of ten billion dollars, a variety of initiatives which laid the groundwork 
for contemporary space weapons systems. As a result, the development and deployment of 
space weapons, is no longer a technological challenge, but a question of political will. 
The legal framework governing space weapons is minimal. The only explicit rules regard-
ing space weapons are those prohibiting conventional weapons on celestial bodies and weap-
ons of mass destruction everywhere in space. Conventional space weapons are therefore legal 
as long as they are based on a satellite rather than the moon. The legal framework has been 
further weakened by the abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Law is therefore no ob-
stacle to deployment. 
At the same time as the technological and legal constraints on deployment are abating, the 
incentives are mounting. The critical role that space has become to play, in both civil and mili-
tary activity, has created the potential for future conflict. The US military is now dependent on 
space assets to wage its preferred style of war. Perhaps even more important, the economic 
benefits of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and other space-based technologies gives the 
US and other countries a substantial interest in maintaining, protecting, and augmenting those 
assets. Discord between peer competitors, such as the one surrounding Galileo, the European 
satellite navigation system, are seen by some as early seeds of greater conflict. Other conflicts 
have arisen due to differences of opinion over the distribution of reconnaissance data and in 
controversies over the use of radio spectra. The effect of all these developments is that space 
policy is being increasingly securitised and framed as a core national interest. 
Against the backdrop of waning constraints and rising incentives, it is no surprise that 
political will is emerging. There have recently been prominent voices within the US military (US 
Space Command Master Plan 2001 and Air Force 2025) and political (Commission to Assess 
United States National Security Space Management and Operations, Rumsfeld, 2000) leader-
ship in favour of considering the acquisition of space weapons. In the US military document 
‘Vision 2020’, for instance, it is argued that the United States should seek capacity to operate 
freely within all technological domains of land, sea, air, space, and information. A decision on 
deployment could therefore be impending. 
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Not business as usual 
The decision on whether to acquire space weapons is not like any other strategic choice. One 
reason is the asymmetrical nature of the available options before and after deployment. Histor-
ically, the introduction of new weapons systems is generally an irreversible path-dependent 
process. Put another way, it is much easier not to deploy a new system than it is to withdraw it 
following deployment, even if they prove unsuitable or destabilising. Nations will indefinitely 
be able to choose to deploy space weapons, but once deployed it will be difficult ever to return 
to a situation of no such weapons. This irreversibility of deployment suggests that substantial 
consideration be put into debate. 
The relative peace characterising the current international situation is a further reason why 
the decision on space weapons is different. Whereas the development of many new weapon 
systems, including weapons of mass destruction and many advances in aircraft and ships, have 
occurred during times of war, currently we have more breathing space to think before we act. 
This is a unique opportunity to consider the costs and benefits of space weapons, including 
those of the long term, prior to making a decision on their deployment. The long term conse-
quences are far reaching and impinge fundamentally on humanity’s prospects for a peaceful 
future. 
All in all, given the nascent political will, a decision that could have irreversible and sub-
stantial long-term ramifications can happen within a few years timescale. In the meantime, 
effective regulation or prohibition of space weapons could be a rapidly disappearing opportu-
nity. As such, the issue of space weapons deserves immediate and careful attention. 
A brief history of space and defence 
The military use of space is not new. Access and utilisation of space is of national interest. In 
addition to the economic potential of commercial exploitation of space and celestial bodies, 
space is the ultimate military high ground. Historically, space-based military assets have been 
largely passive, concentrating on activities such as reconnaissance, communications, and navi-
gation. Indeed, expenditure on space by the military has consistently outweighed civil spend-
ing. Even some scientific exploration missions have arguably been dominated by military ob-
jectives, such as the pursuit of technological supremacy during the Cold War which led both to 
the first satellite (Sputnik, 1957) and human (Yuri Gagarin, 1961) in space and culminated in 
the manned lunar programme (Apollo, 1963-72). 
To date, no offensive space-based weapon has been deployed. The closest it came was 
during the parallel anti-satellite (ASAT) programmes developed by the US and Soviet Union that 
were begun in the sixties. These programmes primarily developed a variety of ‘kinetic kill’ vehi-
cles, though initiatives for ground-based laser systems were also begun. Specifically these in-
cluded initiatives such as nuclear pumped X-ray lasers, space-based optical lasers, radiation-belt 
weapons, ground-based reflected laser systems, and space-based interceptors. While many of 
these initiatives were not carried through, the technology base they developed enable the near-
term deployment of space weapons. In addition, many of the main components of space-
weapon systems are already used in the civilian space sector. Telemetry, tracking, and control 
systems for a remote sensing communications satellite, for example, are very similar to analo-
gous systems within a space weapon. Testing of such systems was periodically prohibited or 
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left unfunded by the US Congress during the eighties and nineties. The US military also expres-
sed its disinclination to use kinetic kill ASATs that tend to create large clouds of space debris. 
Meanwhile, the broader international community has repeatedly stated its support for 
space to be used for peaceful purposes only. This position was codified early in the space age 
by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), through which 96 states, including the US and former 
USSR, recognised the common interest of all humankind in the exploration and use of outer 
space for ‘peaceful purposes’. The OST explicitly prohibits treaty states from placing weapons 
of mass destruction in space or weapons of any kind on celestial bodies. In 2001, the UN 
General Assembly approved by a 156-0 vote the basis for a treaty establishing a permanent 
prohibition on space-based weapons (Resolution 56/535). Recently, a joint working paper on 
preventing space weapons was introduced by China and Russia in the UN Conference on 
Disarmament (UNCD). 
Against this background of inactivity and caution, new elements have in recent years be-
gun advocating the consideration of new space weapons with strike capabilities. In April, 2003, 
for example, the US Congressman representing NASA’s Florida base stated his support for 
weapons deployed in space: ‘We must adopt a doctrine that states that we as a nation will vigo-
rously pursue the ability to project power to, through and from space against any aggressor’. 
He also noted, ‘It would be inappropriate to deny ourselves this advantage simply because of 
romantic notions of some that space is some type of sacred place’. 
Perhaps more significantly, elements of the US military have advocated a strategy to in-
clude the deployment of space weapons within a matter of a few years. However, this position 
has not yet been adopted at the highest level. In fact, many military officers still regard space-
based weapons with a dubious eye. The military focus on space, however, has been reaffirmed 
repeatedly in key documents such as Air Force Vision 2020 and other related strategic planning 
documents. 
Definitions 
There is no strict definition of a space weapon. Whether to include both weapons and targets 
located in space, direct and indirect applications of force, and temporary impairment as well as 
permanent destruction all shape the debate. In table 1, following the theme of this article, we 
characterise the generally agreed areas (black and white) as well as the grey areas. Military space 
activities are grouped into three categories. Activities in the white area are military applications 
of space that do not entail force application from assets stationed in space. The black area 
comprises technologies that fit the traditional definition of space weapons. The weapons in the 
interstitial grey area are more difficult to categorically classify because they span a range of 
technologies. These technologies may blur the line between space-based and space-transiting 
weapons; for example, one strategy that has been considered is the use of temporarily-em-
placed weapons that orbit for days to weeks. 
A representative example of this conception can be taken from a 1998 working group of the 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which states: ‘A space weapon 
is a device stationed in outer space (including the moon and other celestial bodies) or in the 
Earth’s environment designed to destroy, damage or otherwise interfere with the normal func-
tioning of an object or being in outer space, or being in the earth environment’. 
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Table 1: The spectrum of military space activity: what is a space weapon? 
Space Weapons 
(Generally or historically 
prohibited) 
Intermediate Systems Military activities not 
involving Space Weapons 
(Generally allowed) 
[Key Words: Degrade, 
Destroy] 
- WMD or radiological 
weapons 
- Space-based directed energy 
weapons 
- Space-based kinetic weapons 
- Anti-satellite satellites (ASAT) 
destruction or degrade other 
satellites 
[Key words: Deny, Disrupt] 
- ASAT – Deny access to satellite 
or ground system, passive 
measures, encryption 
- ASAT – Temporarily interfere 
with satellite or ground system 
(cyber attacks etc.) operation 
- ASAT Disrupt operations of 
space or ground segments 
permanently 
- Ground-based directed (at 
space) weapons 
- Nuclear weapons for NEO 
defence 
- Ground based jamming 
- Suborbital intercept missiles for 
missile defence 
- Communication 
- Navigation 
- Reconnaissance (space-based or 
high altitude platforms) 
- Space-monitoring networks 
- Early warning systems ICBM 
with suborbital trajectory 
- Suborbital delivery of troops or 
equipment 
 
Not surprisingly, white activities are readily employed in today’s world by many nations 
and some of the grey capabilities are maintained by a significant number of nations. Systems 
within the black area are not fully developed or deployed, but have been the subject of intense 
national and international discussion due to their potential to create instability in international 
affairs. 
Though debatably outside the traditional definition of space weapons, it may be the tech-
nologies within the grey area that deserve the most immediate attention. They are the most 
likely to be deployed in the short term, and could certainly exert the effects of other traditional 
space-based weapons. A clear line needs to be agreed upon between states. 
Space as a strategic domain 
Space is a strategic domain, like the land, air, and sea. It can be viewed as the ultimate high 
ground, by analogy to traditionally successful land strategy, or as a vast unpopulated medium 
through which things travel, like the sea. Space is an observation platform, a communications 
hub, host to a highly accurate positioning system, a medium through which ICBMs pass, a pris-
tine scientific environment, and a vast untapped commercial frontier. 
The military significance of space is inextricably linked to its resource value and utility for 
both civilian and military purposes. Like it or not, military principles established over thou-
sands of years of human conflict are extending into space, as they did for airspace in the last 
century. Overall military significance is particularly important in structuring a stable status quo. 
For example, Antarctica is a military-free zone by international treaty, and a large part of the  
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stability of this treaty is due to the low military value of Antarctica, which like space is 
unpopulated, hostile to life, and of unique scientific interest. If Antarctica was all temperate 
meadows, or had the strategic uses that space does, it is not clear that the same treaty alone 
would produce a stable peace. 
Conflict in or through space could form one aspect of a ground-based war, arise from 
disputes over resources in space, or uses of space that interfere with others. In the present 
preferred style of warfare, military dominance on land relies on air dominance, and contribu-
tions from passive space-based systems in the form of battlefield intelligence, navigation, and 
communication are beneficial, but not a necessity for victory. In the future, space dominance 
could conceivably become a deciding factor as improvements in ground force capabilities stem 
from the use of space-related systems, leading to a tiered dominance with space at the top – 
‘the ultimate high ground’ (see figure 1). 
Space is unpopulated, and large-scale destruction in space does not imply the loss of life 
that might occur on land, though the way wars are fought may never make the two inter-
changeable. To achieve a military objective in any given conflict, the addition of air support to 
ground forces provides a ‘sharper’ tool with which to progress; by bombing selected targets 
ground forces encounter low-
er opposition, in effect spar-
ing lives that would other-
wise be lost by ground as-
sault alone. Similarly, the evo-
lution of air systems to em-
ploy space-based GPS gui-
dance has further sharpened 
this approach. Combined with 
air and space-based imaging 
to identify weak points, this 
mode of combat more ef-
fectively than ever before 
combats an opponent by pre-
venting them from fighting, 
rather than by attrition. An opponent seeking to win by pure numbers in a future conflict may 
wish to begin by disabling current passive space-based systems. The risk of militarising space 
to protect this capability therefore opposes the risk of fighting bloodier wars. 
Ultimately, the way space is used for defence, offence, and is itself defended is determined 
by the peculiarities of orbital mechanics and many other unique aspects of the Earth-Space 
boundary, which, unlike policy, force structure, and military technology, do not change. The 
timescale of space transit is minutes, in comparison with other more conventional arenas 
shown in table 2, in which transit timescales slow even the fastest conflict to a comparable 
crawl. An ascent to low earth orbit (LEO) takes 3-10 minutes, and the fastest LEO trajectory 
could take as little as 45 minutes to reach the opposite side of the planet. This is the expected 
timescale for an exchange of space-transiting weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBMs). Space-based weapons, for example lasers, may occupy a more distant medium  
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Present and possible future reliance on different military domains 
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Table 2. Fundamental characteristics of military domains 
 Transit timescale Perceived defensibility 
Land Days High 
Sea Days High 
Air Hours High 
Space Minutes-hours Low 
Cyberspace Seconds High 
 
earth orbit (MEO), increasing the intercept time to hours and allowing the possessor a near-
instant strike from a weapon that has up to a third of the world’s surface in its field of view at 
any one time. In contrast, the logistical build-up for major conventional military action takes 
months, and combat itself days to weeks – long enough for top-level international political and 
decision-making structures to operate, and the possibility of diplomacy to defer or diffuse the 
situation. 
There are no bushes in space, no clouds, and no atmosphere to constrain viable ways to 
detect objects. The nearest naturally occurring obstacle is the moon, many hours away. Objects 
in space can in principle been seen by all, though the capabilities of individual nations vary, and 
limited stealth techniques can still be used in space. For this reason, an arms race of space-
based weapons could occur in disguise or via ‘dual use’ technologies. It could occur on the 
ground in the form of space-transiting weapons that are stowed until used, similar to ICBMs of 
the cold war. Potentially, an outlawed and previously unknown space-transiting weapon need 
only be revealed by launching it, though one might reasonably expect to become aware of 
involved or widespread development efforts by means of intelligence gathering efforts or 
facility inspections. 
The economic and security context 
The issue of space weapons must be assessed in light of contemporary economic and security 
developments in space technology. Arguments over commercial and security, non-armament 
uses of space may have important effects on the issue of space weapons. Galileo, the European 
Union’s embryonic satellite navigation system, to take one example, is in direct competition 
with the American GPS. GPS data is used worldwide for anything from cellular telephones to 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). With the United States suffering from trade (and now 
budget) deficits on the order of hundreds of billions annually, the tens of billions generated by 
GPS in US national income is a welcome contribution that the US Government would like to 
maintain in the future. Not only does the EU aim to capture a share of the GPS market, the 
Galileo system would also make the EU independent from US military data for modern warfare. 
The twin drivers of economics and security create a context of potential friction even between 
allies. 
Another important example of such friction comes in the area of remote sensing surveil-
lance satellites, and the specific issue of shutter control. The continuing proliferation of high-
resolution imaging capability has reduced the superpowers’ exclusive hold on this strategic 
resource. In general, this development has been positive and has increased the stability of the 
global system. However, during conflict, these capabilities may become a source of tension.  
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Table 3. Strategic analysis: deployment probabilities and outcomes 
 Other states do not deploy 
space weapons 
Other states deploy 
state weapons 
Dominant state does not 
deploy space weapons 
Outcome 1: Likely, 
Stable 
Outcome 2: Less 
likely, Unstable 
Dominant state deploys space 
weapons 
Outcome 3: Less likely, 
Unstable 
Outcome 4: Likely, 
Uncertain outcome: 
Arms race or Stable 
 
One early suggestion of this came during the 1991 Gulf War, when SPOT, the French satellite 
imagery company, began receiving increasingly stern warnings from the US military about its 
data products over the Middle East. 
Multiple outcomes 
It is important to understand the strategic dimensions of the decision on whether to deploy 
space weapons or not. The choice should not be reduced to a question of whether the required 
technological capacity, financial wealth, and political will is available, since outcomes emerge 
out of the strategic interaction between all the relevant actors. Whether a dominant state will 
enhance its comparative advantage or gain national security by acquiring a new weapons sys-
tem therefore depends on how the other states are responding. 
As illustrated in table 3, there are multiple possible outcomes in such a strategic situation. 
The worst-case scenario after the deployment of space weapons would be an arms race in 
space. Other possible outcomes include a competitive but stable system, or a unipolar stable 
system akin to the current US dominance of the high seas. 
Regardless of its power, a dominant actor cannot determine the outcome unilaterally. On 
the contrary, without due regard to the likely responses of other states, the rational choice of a 
dominant actor to make a first move could result in a collective outcome that makes everybody 
worse off, including the dominant actor. Any potential dominant actor should therefore care-
fully consider the probable response of other states to the placement of its weapons in space, 
and the effect these responses will have on global security. 
In addition to the risk of starting an arms race with space weapons, states should also con-
sider the likelihood of spill-over effects into other strategic areas. The impact on nuclear strate-
gy is particularly important to assess. Space weapons, along with information warfare, could 
eventually replace nuclear deterrence as a central strategic policy. This strategy could provide 
the post-nuclear deterrence paradigm for the United States and other nations. Such a shift 
could be positive or negative on overall security: On the one hand, it could reduce the overall 
reliance on nuclear weapons by the dominant state – a positive effect. On the other hand, due 
to an increased military gap between the dominant state and other nations, the move could also 
lead to an increased likelihood of use of nuclear weapons by countries as a last resort and 
decrease the threshold for using a nuclear weapon in a conflict. 
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Many players 
There is no shortage of potential actors that might respond to a first move by a state. While 
the US and Russia lead in capacity, the European Union, China and India all have the requisite 
technical capabilities for at least certain space weapons systems. 
Given a first move by another state, the US is likely to act quickly to ensure dominance in 
this domain. The reaction of Russia, whose military strength still relies heavily on its nuclear 
weapons capability, to such a threat would also act to counter the initial deployment of space 
weapons with those of its own since any attempt to move from the nuclear deterrence para-
digm would reduce its power. 
The European Union may move to competitive behaviour as development of collective 
space defence infrastructure is initiated. Efforts to reduce reliance on the United States are 
considerable, as demonstrated by the effort in the Galileo navigation system. Explicitly addres-
sing the connection between European Security and Space, European Research Commissioner 
Philippe Bus-quin has said that space-based observation, communication and navigation sys-
tems represent exceptional tools for the construction and reinforcement of the European Uni-
on, in particular with respect to European Security and Defence Policy. 
China is also investing heavily in space and has publicly announced plans of lunar explora-
tion. It is unlikely to want to be restricted and has proposed a treaty banning space weapons in 
the UN Conference on Disarmament. 
Moreover, history suggests that if one strong player on the international arena gets too 
powerful, then the other smaller players may combine to produce a counterbalance. Such be-
haviour was in clear display by Germany, France, Russia and China, during the lead up to the 
war in Iraq. The dominant state should therefore not only consider the chance of single na-
tions countering their actions, but the risk of many nations combining initiatives. 
Short-term gains and costs 
The judgment of whether to deploy space weapons should be based on a detailed analysis of 
their effects on stability and welfare in the short, medium and long term. Only by considering 
all of these time frames it is possible to make an informed cost-benefit analysis of space weap-
ons and their impact on security. The following analysis is an attempt to outline some of the 
key issues that need to be taken into consideration. The main purpose is an impartial list of the 
potential pros and cons of such weapons. We will begin by assessing some of the most imme-
diate aspects. 
In a short-term perspective of less than a decade, several advantages of space weapons can 
be imagined: 
 
1. A superior weapon: Space weapons are potentially a primary tool for information domi-
nance, and thus may be a key to battlefield dominance in contemporary war. Space 
weapons enable an advantage in time and space over an adversary which enables a 
state to acquire and maintain the initiative. This would mean increased capability to 
halt potential aggressors more effectively, with less collateral damage and probably 
earlier, compared to conventional arms. [Table 3, Outcome 3] 
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2. First mover advantage: If the readiness for deployment of space weapons is low among 
other countries, the first state to deploy will enjoy a short-term advantage. 
3. Protection of space assets: Assets in space are a critical part of modern communications, 
navigation and information gathering, vital to the economy, vital to security and in 
demand in everyday life. Damage to these assets could seriously cripple a nation. 
Thus the ability to prevent hostile attack, whether from the ground or from space, is 
desirable. 
4. Image of technical supremacy: By bolstering the image of technological supremacy, space 
weapons could act as a deterrent to hostile action. 
5. Other: Military and commercial industry can be bolstered by gains from long-term (>5 
years) research and development projects. 
 
On the other hand, a range of short term disadvantages are possible: 
 
1. Ineffective and expensive: Space weapons could become the analogue of the 19th century 
Dreadnaught ships; very expensive to produce and deploy, with little tactical advan-
tage. Worse, they could provide a false sense of superiority that justifies unwise ac-
tions. Actual performance of weapons placed in space may be overstated and not 
cost-effective. Most critically, due to orbital dynamics, space weapons require an en-
tire orbit to strike (typically 90 minutes) which may not have a fast enough response 
time to have any ‘revolutionary’ effect. In addition, their expense is highlighted by the 
fact that whilst the United States continues to explore space solutions for missile de-
fence, the very high cost and low availability of such weapons as space-based lasers 
has led the nation to defer pursuing space-based lasers for the indefinite future. 
2. Vulnerability: Space weapons aimed at Earth targets will need to be in low earth orbit 
(LEO) for a quicker response time and greater effectiveness. Hardware in LEO is rela-
tively easy to monitor and is more susceptible to ground-based attack. In fact, most 
military officials acknowledge that, at least for the time being, leo-based weapons run 
the risk of being orbital sitting ducks. 
3. Provocation to diplomatic and arms-control efforts: Unilateral deployment of space weapons 
could spark an international backlash which compromises the interests of many other 
diplomatic efforts of the nations initiating such a move. This could make it more dif-
ficult to achieve goals on other strategic interests. While the Outer Space Treaty only 
explicitly bans ‘weapons of mass destruction’ from outer space, global political opin-
ion tends strongly to the view that any weapon in outer space violates the spirit of 
that Treaty. 
4. Public unrest: The majority of the public worldwide appears to oppose space weapons. 
There is also a history of civil unrest concerning issues of military uses of space and 
the use of nuclear power in space. Similar movements might accompany the deploy-
ment of space weapons. These movements perceive an opportunity for humanity to 
make a psychological leap in the way matters are solved by halting the spread of de-
structive weapons to the space frontier. 
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Medium-term gains and costs 
Second, also in a medium-term perspective, looking between ten and twenty years ahead in 
time, there are certain advantages of space weapons: 
 
1. Stable domination: Cognisant of the arms-race arguments against unilateral moves in 
space (see below), some argue that restraint on the part of a nation such as the United 
States may not persuade other nations from moving ahead to their own advantage. 
Seizing the initiative, they argue, could enable the United States to stop an arms race 
before it starts by establishing a globally dominant, stabilising force in space. 
2. Global stabilising effect on earth: The past half-decade has seen considerable instability 
and conflict throughout the world. The latest threat is global terrorism. Space offers 
not only the ability to detect threats globally on very short time scales, but some be-
lieve it may also offer the ability to counter those threats from space on similarly 
short time scales. 
3. Basis for new multilateral security-co-operation regime: While military use of space is still 
largely dominated by the United States and to a lesser extent a handful of other major 
powers, its benefits for support of other military operations are manifest. Space-based 
weapons systems might enhance these benefits even more. While such situations 
could lay the seeds of an arms race (see below), they might also be the basis of new 
co-operative security regimes in outer space. If placed at the service of global coali-
tions and following agreed ‘rules of the road’, space arms might serve as a stabilising 
influence. 
 
At the same time, there are potential disadvantages also in the medium term: 
 
1. Arms race in space: The current global perception is that the United States has a techni-
cal lead in the military use of space. This strategic advantage may lead other nations to 
accelerate their space security efforts. This might trigger an arms race. For example, 
the deployment of an ASAT could instigate the development and deployment of a 
‘DSAT’ to counter an ASAT. Such an arms race might also blur the distinction between 
conventional and mass destruction weapons in space. [Table 3, Outcome 4] 
2. Asymmetric defence (Nitze criteria): If there is an economic or tactical asymmetry in the 
relationship between a weapons system and that system’s countermeasure, it could 
easily lead to an arms race – or to a situation in which an expensive weapon is ren-
dered useless by a cheap defence. This is an elaboration on the point above. For ex-
ample, a ton of gravel launched in an appropriate orbit could act as deliberate ‘space 
debris’, destroying billions of dollars in both national security and commercial space 
assets. 
Long-term gains and costs 
Third, some advantages of space weapons might only emerge in a long term perspective of at 
least twenty years:  
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1. Basis of outer space ‘Naval’ Paradigm: The existence of weaponry in global ‘common’ 
areas can be a long-term positive and welcome influence. The standard analogy of 
outer space is to the world’s oceans including the presence of global, weaponised 
navies dominated by a single power (in the 19th Century Great Britain and in the 20th 
the United States). This regime may be applicable to space and could result in security 
in space akin to the world’s oceans, with all nations operating free from interference 
based on an internationally recognised ‘Law of the Sea’. 
2. Economic impetus to large-scale space exploitation: Today much of the developmental 
spending on space, perhaps the majority of it, is spent on security-related expendi-
tures. Indeed, the US Apollo programme and associated ‘space race’ was arguably 
based mostly on security-related competition. Some argue that large-scale military 
space spending, particularly on weapons and even with (and maybe in light of) an 
arms race, will ignite rapid development of space technologies at a pace not seen since 
Apollo. As with the opening of the American West, military pathfinders and opera-
tions might presage finance and enable large-scale civil and economic development of 
space assets. 
 
Notwithstanding, the long term disadvantages must also be taken into account: 
 
1. Threat to long-term peace: Many believe that the choice for or against the deployment of 
space weapons is fundamentally linked to whether humans will have weapons in their 
long-term future. Humanity has a shared interest in a peaceful future in space. De-
ploying space weapons might threaten that future rather than enable it. New strategi-
cally important weapons quickly become embedded into national security strategies. 
Such weapons become so deeply embedded in the dominant political paradigm that 
they are largely impossible to remove from the strategic arena – and certainly impossi-
ble to remove from the global arsenal. Nuclear weapons represent a good example, 
and in this regard there is no reason to think that space weapons shall be any differ-
ent. Once space weapons are deployed, it may be impossible to eliminate them even if 
they prove unsuitable and dangerous to humanity. Humanity appears to be on the 
verge of expansion into space and this expansion will set precedents for our future 
civilisation. Whether or not future human settlements on other planets have to deal 
with weapons will depend on today’s decisions 
2. Proliferation of weapons: Arguably the biggest threat to a dominant nation’s security is 
based on the proliferation of weapons which it has played a large part in developing: 
Certainly the biggest threat to the US has been the potential use of nuclear weapons 
on the US home soil. By analogy, the first state to deploy space weapons may find 
itself faced all too soon with these same weapons as they proliferate. This is particu-
larly true of space weapons which are considerably easier to produce than nuclear 
weapons. As the current global superpower, the US has a choice to try to use space 
weapons to its advantage, but add these to its proliferation concerns or attempt to 
manage them by spearheading a reliable legal and verification regime for preventing 
their deployment by any nation. 
3. The unique environment of space: Some argue that is important to keep in mind that space 
has a unique identity beyond a traditional arena of classical balance of power politics. 
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Space is different. Space is humanity’s shared resource and common heritage. The 
question of whether weapons should be deployed in space is therefore an issue 
beyond the interests of any one country or generation. 
The way ahead 
There are positive and negative attributes of space weapons: On the one hand it is necessary to 
recognise that space is integral to virtually all security operations through its communications, 
surveillance and other support functions and that there are potential advantages, particularly in 
the short term, of deploying weapons in space. Conversely, not all weapons systems are a good 
idea, even for the best intentioned, since they are not vastly more effective than conventional 
weapons and moreover, they can have political and unintended security ramifications in the 
long term which far outweigh their benefits. Despite these seemingly conflicting issues, there 
may be areas for fruitful compromise on space weapons. 
Faced with a decision on deployment that might come sooner rather than later, nations 
have to think about how the international community should respond to this extraordinary 
issue on the security agenda of the 21st century. Three main options are available: 
 
1. Fairly comprehensive prohibition: A ban of space weapons would halt the potential for an 
arms race. The disadvantage is that it may constrain states if a situation arises and a 
state decides to abrogate a ban. A legal regime would ideally be negotiated in an inter-
national forum such as the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. However, if 
stalemate persists, a less encompassing agreement could be agreed at an ad-hoc gath-
ering. One possible solution is for a country, which supports the prohibition of space 
weapons, to host a treaty conference for interested nations. This model was followed 
successfully in the so-called ‘Ottawa Process’, which led to the successful Ottawa 
Land Mines Treaty. Means of verification for monitoring compliance would be vital 
to the successful implementation of a prohibition. In this regard, much could be 
learned from the Chemical Weapons Convention. A great challenge, however, would 
be to establish effective sanctions against violations of the treaty. Without sanctions, 
it is difficult to achieve credible commitments to the legal regime, which jeopardises 
international co-operation. 
2. A mid-ranging legal regime: An international agreement on space weapons analogous to 
the International Law of Sea could be created. This could lead to a stable situation 
that avoids the earlier pitfalls. It could require an international regime backed up by 
global, real-time monitoring. The downside is that it is not concrete and might be 
overtaken by events. 
3. No regime: In this current state of uncertainty, the global security in the mid-term 
future is unclear. The major concern is the potential for an arms race in space. With-
out establishing the rules of the road, even the lead nations are subject to consequen-
ces, especially in a domain as potentially asymmetric as space. 
 
In essence, the challenge is to manage space in a way that avoids the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’. In order to avoid this self-destructive logic, we have to escape ending up in a 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’, where co-operation is impossible due to lack of communication and trust 
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among the actors. Because of the strategic nature of the situation, all states, and in particular 
those with ambitions and capabilities regarding space, should work together. A frank and open 
discussion should begin in the nations closest to the possibility of much larger military uses of 
outer space. One possibly fruitful area for opening international negotiations leading towards a 
legal regime could be in defining hostile and prohibited acts in space. These efforts can be 
directed towards building agreement amongst the space powers of the ‘Rules of the Road’ in 
order to regulate the use of space. 
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